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A Step Forward in Protecting Human Rights: Canada v. Ward 
"Internationalrehgee law was formu- 
lated to serve as abackup tothe protec- 
tiononeexpectsfr@mthe state of which 
an individual is a national." (Par. 28) 
In its first thorough examination of 
the Convention refugee definition, the 
Supreme Court of Canada has power- 
fully affirmed that protection of those at 
risk of serious hurnan rights violations is 
the lens through which refugee law must 
be focused. The decision of June 30,1993 
in the appeal of Patrick Francis Ward is a 
carefully tailored guide to interpreting 
almost every aspect of the refugee defini- 
tionin this light. This formulation broad- 
ens the scope of the definition to include 
those genuinely ladking protection from 
imminent harm while cutting shy of 
those who have other viable options than 
to seekrefugee status. Thedecision steers 
a course away from the days when refu- 
gee law was used lio condemn publicly 
enemy states for their misbehaviour or to 
weed out the undpsirable immigrants 
from the welcohe ones. 
The l r n r n i ~ ~  Ad (s. 2(1)) defines a 
Convention refugee as: 
"any penon who 
a) by reason of a well-founded fear of 
persecution for easons of race, reli- 
gion, nationality, membership in a so- 
cial group or polil$cal opinion, 
i) is outside the conontry of the person's 
nationality and is wb le  or, by reason 
of that kar, unwilling to avail himself 
of the protection of that country..." 
In recent years, as the Federal Court 
of Appeal has gradually defined the pa- 
rameters of refugee status, it has issued a 
series of somewhat conflicting prec- 
edents as to whether the persecution 
feared must come from the government 
or, if not, when on@ may rely on interna- 
tional refugee protledion against a pri- 
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vate abuser of one's rights. Likewise, the 
boundaries defining the classes of per- 
sons offered protection as Convention 
refugees and in particular those who are 
persecuted on the basis of their "particu- 
lar social group" have remained slightly 
hazy. It is in these two areas that the Ward 
decision offers the most assistance. 
"The rationale underlying interna- 
tional refugee protection is to serve as 
'surrogateF shelter coming into play 
only upon failure of national support. 
When available, home state protection 
is the claimant's sole option ... The as- 
sessment of Convention refugee status 
most consistent with this theme re- 
quires consideration of the availability 
of protection in all countries of citizen- 
ship." (Par. 130) 
By focusing on the goal of protection, 
Justice La Forest separates out those who 
have more appropriate solutions at their 
disposal, while extending protection to 
some who have been excluded as Con- 
vention refugees in the past. He identi- 
fies two categories of persons who are 
not in need of refugee status. Those who 
can gain protection from their own gov- 
ernments or from another country of citi- 
zenship must avail themselves of that 
protectionin lieu of refugee status. Refu- 
gee protection is a last resort reserved for 
those who need it most. 
"My condusion that state complicity 
in persecution is not a prerequisite to a 
valid refugee claim is reinforced by an 
examinationof the history of the provi- 
sion, the prevailing authorities, and 
academic commentary." (Par. 37) 
Writing for a unanimous court, Jus- 
ticeLa Forest includesin the gamut of the 
Convention thosewhose rights are at risk 
of violation from actors other than the 
statebut onlyincircumstances where the 
state is unable to secure effective protec- 
tion. Thus he resolves conflicting posi- 
tions in the Court of Appeal and cuts to 
the heart of the matter. Those who may 
obtain protection of their rights from 
their own government are denied inter- 
national protection, but those who have 
no protection from the harm that they 
fear are inclyded in the class of possible 
refugees. 
By focusing on protection and not 
condemnation of wayward states, the 
previous artificial equation of a state's 
inability to protect with state complicity 
in persecutionis jettisoned. The artificial- 
ity of this equation, advocated in such 
decision as Rajudeen, Surujpaul and 
Zalzali, is clear on the facts of this case. 
Mr. Ward feared persecution from the 
INLA, a military organization seeking to 
overthrow theIrishgovement.Despite 
the government's admission that it was 
powerless to protect Mr. Ward, clearly 
that government cannot be characterized 
as an accomplice in the group's activities. 
The Supreme Court also does away 
with previous attempts to distinguish 
those who are "unable to avail them- 
selves of the protection of the state" from 
those who are "unwilling" to avail them- 
selvesof state protectionbecause of a fear 
of persecution. This distinction, relied on 
by theFederal Court inthis case, required 
that those who were unwilling to rely on 
the state for protection were orily eligible 
for refugee status if the state was 
complicit in persecuting the claimant. 
The Supreme Court recognizes that Mr. 
Ward was both unable and u n w h g  to 
depend on the Irish government's pro- 
tection because they had informed him 
that they were unable to protect him ef- 
fectively. 
"It would seem to defeat the purpose 
of international protection if a claimant 
would be required to risk his or her life 
seeking ineffective protection of a 
state, merely to demonstrate its inef- 
fectiveness." (Par. 67) 
This decision also disposes of any 
strid requirement that the individual 
must formally request protection before 
concluding that it is unavailable. Again, 
this is done in view of best achieving the 
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goal of effective protection. The test 
which Judge La Forest advocates is that 
formulated by Professor James 
Hathaway-that the person would only 
be required to approach the state for pro- 
tection "if it might reasonably be forth- 
coming." This allowance is tempered by 
a new presumption that nations are ca- 
pable of protecting their citizens. The 
presumption can only be rebutted by 
"clear and convincing confirmation" of a 
state's inability to effectively protect the 
claimant. 
While this presumption increases the 
burden on the claimant, a second favour- 
able presumption comes into play if one 
is able to demonstrate the state's inability 
to protect oneself. 
"Having established that the claimant 
has a fear, the board is, in my view, 
entitled to presume that persecution 
will be likely, and the fear well- 
founded, if there is an absence of state 
protection." (Par. 62) 
The Ward decision makes lack of pro- 
tection by the state the central element of 
the refugee definition. The above pre- 
sumption indicates that those who are so 
marghakd as to feel their security to 
be threatened and who lack protection 
by the state can be presumed to be in 
need of international protection as refu- 
gees. Of course, this presumption only 
acts in conjunction with the presumption 
that states are presumed to be able to 
protect their citizens except in the face of 
clear evidence to the contrary. 
" ... [Tlhe international community did 
not intend to offera haven to all suffer- 
ing individuals." (Par. 85) 
The focus on protection of the mar- 
ginabed is taken up again in Justice La 
Forest's lengthy discussion of the classes 
of persons included in the provision for 
protection from persecution because of 
"membership in a particular social 
group." The Convention refugee defini- 
tion requires not only that the claimant 
be at risk of serious human rights viola- 
tions but that one be at risk because of 
one's race, nationality, religion, political 
opinion or membership in a particular 
sacial group. Justice La Forest affinns 
that these five grounds were intended to 
narrow the class of persons eligible for 
protection to those marginalized 
through discrimination. 
Therefore, he rejects aninterpretation 
of "social group" which would offerpro- 
tection to any persecuted person who 
merely belongs to an association or so- 
ciological classification. Instead he irn- 
ports an interpretation from Canadian 
antidiscrimination law by finding that 
"membership in a particular social 
group" subsumes grounds of persecu- 
tion which are analogous to the other 
four grounds. 
"Canada's obligation to offer haven to 
those fleeing persecution is not unlim- 
ited ... Canada should not overstep its 
role in the international sphere byhav- 
ing its responsibility engaged when- 
ever any group is targeted. Surelythere 
are some groups, the affiliation in 
which is not so important to the indi- 
vidual that it would be appropriate to 
have the person dissociate him- or her- 
self from it before Canada's responsi- 
bility should be engaged." (Par. 102) 
Justice La Forest identifies as most in 
need those who face mistreatment be- 
cause of a personal characteristic which 
they cannot change or should not be re- 
quired to change because it is fundamen- 
tal to their human dignity. These persons 
fall into three categories: 
1. groups defined by an innate or un- 
changeable characteristic, 
2. groups whose members voluntarily 
associate for reasons so fundamental 
to their human dignity that they 
should not be forced to forsake the 
association, and 
3. groups associated by a former vol- 
untary status unalterable due to its 
historical permanence. (Par. 103) 
While these categories cover most 
persons persecuted on a discriminatory 
basis, note that what is omitted are those 
who face persecution for a former invol- 
untary status, for example, persons for- 
merly conscripted into an army, former 
prisoners or persons born in a particular 
region or taken there by their parents. 
These too are conditions which are 
unalterable due to their historical 
permanence. 
Nonetheless, the framework is ex- 
tremely helpful in putting an end to ad 
hoc characterizations of social group and 
st- clear of any t#mptation to find 
those persons in Cumeht political favour 
to fit within the " partiaular social group" 
ground while excluding others equally 
deserving and in need of protection. 
On the facts of the Ward case, the court 
found that the INLA is not a "particular 
social group" for the purpose of the refu- 
gee definitionbecause its commitment to 
violently overthrow the Irish govern- 
ment is not a purpose which is so funda- 
mental to their h u m a ~  dignity that they 
should not be required to forgo it. More 
importantly, it ruled W t  Mr. Ward was 
persecuted by the INLA not because of 
his membership or former membership 
in that group but becquse of his dissent- 
ing opinions and aqtions against the 
group. Therefore, the court concluded 
that Mr. Ward was persecuted because 
of his political opinion in opposition to 
the INLA. 
This decision thus clarifies that it is 
essential to correctly identify the reason 
for the persecution when determining 
whether it is within the five grounds. It is 
not enough to show that the claimant 
belongs to a particular social group, but 
the claimant must show that her fear of 
persecution is because of that member- 
ship or characteristic. 
Finally, Judge La Porest examines the 
claimant's fear of pewcution on the ba- 
sis of his dissenting political opinion. He 
adopts Professor Goodwin-Gill's broad 
definition of political opinion which en- 
compasses "any opinion on any matter 
in which the machinery of the state, gov- 
ernment, and policy may be engaged" 
(Par. 118) 
Justice La Forest lays out the govern- 
ing principles for assessing a fear of per- 
secution based on political opinion. He 
writes that the perception of the persecu- 
tor is the determinative one. That is to say 
that if the persecutor believes that the 
claimant holds an opposing political 
opinion and persecutes the claimant for 
that reason, the claimant can be said to 
fear persecution on the basis of political 
opinion. It is immaterial whether the 
claimant has expressed or actually holds 
the imputed opinion. 
He emphasizes that therelwant view 
is not necessarily that of the governing 
authority, the claimant or the refugee 
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